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This article explains how the state administration in Uzbekistan is using historiography as an 
instrument for diverse objectives consist of legitimization of its political authority among common 
masses, establishing the country as a great power and achieving its geopolitical ambitions. The author 
argues that new historiography is anti-Soviet in nature, aimed at the erosion of Soviet past, constructing 
the myth of lengthy freedom struggle, depicting Tamerlane as a national hero and establishing the 
Uzbek President Islam Karimov as brave leader equiseta to Tamerlane. Subjective construction, 
deconstruction and reconstruction of historical events are the prime features of new historiography 
of post-Soviet Uzbekistan. Though, this might be a source  of legitimacy for the Karimov regime and 
helpful to get recognition for Uzbekistan as a great power, but it has its adverse consequences in 
the domestic circles as well as in the foreign affairs which could be seen in the form of validation 
of Karimov’s authoritarianism, emergence of anti-Russian feelings and the imperialistic geopolitical 
designs of Uzbekistan in Central Asia. 
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Introduction
Historiography contains the elements of 
modernity theoretically, but it is dominated 
by post-modern ingredients in reality. Reason 
being, irrespective of the existing norm 
of objectivity, it is not free of subjectivity 
(Hopkins, 2007: NP). Credible level of 
objectiveness is difficult to achieve in the said 
area (Janhunen, 2010: 127). In other words, it is 
neither an objective science nor has ability to 
discover the absolute truth (Miller, 2010: NP). 
History writing involves a person or group of 
persons called ‘historians’ who are influenced 
by diverse social, economic, cultural and 
political factors while recording and evaluating 
the historical events. Time to time, having own 
political proclivities or preferences, they adopt 
diverse methodological approaches to write, 
re-write, interpret and reinterpret the historical 
events/accounts (Blake, 1955: 61). Thus, 
historiographical picture which is constructed, 
deconstructed and then, transmitted to the 
common masses by the historiographers rarely 
presents the losers’ perspective. In a way, 
historiographers write for winners and not 
for losers. They justify the actions of winners 
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against losers. For example, it happened after 
the defeat of axis powers in Second World War. 
Circumstances which were ‘favourable’ for the 
losers were ignored or distorted systematically 
in the post-war international historiographical 
discourse. Actions of winners against losers 
were justified. Similarly, losers of the Cold War 
especially Soviets received little sympathy or 
objectiveness from the New World Order led by 
the United States (Janhunen, 2010: 127). Thus, 
on various occasions, historiography is used as 
an instrument by the states and their governing 
regimes in order to legitimize the present 
politics and achieve the other desired goals. 
History is politicized with public practices 
and norms which may involve commemoration 
measures such as building monuments and 
museums, establishing archives, celebrating 
anniversaries of significant events of the past and 
highlighting certain episodes in history while 
ignoring or marginalizing others (Janhunen, 2010: 
127). Governing elite, explicitly or implicitly, 
influences the politics of memory and historical 
research by regulating access to archives, setting 
standards of historical education and practicing 
priority funding of scientific research and 
publications on history problems (Miller, 2010: 
NP). 
Collective historical roots and memories 
ensure the continuity and solidarity within a 
community/nation. Without a shared history 
nation can’t exist and survive for a long period. It is 
bound to diminish. As the feelings of nationalism 
are pre-requisite for the survival and solidarity of 
nation, historiographers play decisive role in the 
creation or/evolution of such national sentiments 
by writing and recording shared historical events, 
celebrations, ceremonies, and days of joys and 
sorrows along with the heroes, warriors, martyrs 
and liberators of the past(Miller, 2010: NP). As 
Eric J. Hobsbawm and David J. Kertzer also 
write:
...historians are to nationalism what 
poppy-growers ...are to the heroin-addicts: 
we supply the essential raw material for 
the market. Nations without a past are 
contradictions in terms. What makes a 
nation is the past, what justifies one nation 
against others is the past, and historians are 
the people who produce it (Hobsbawm and 
Kertzer, 1992: 3).
Since the past of a nation determines its 
future, today, a vigorous growth of politicisation 
of history to create or promote nationalism is 
being observed in the third world in general and 
post-Soviet Central Asia in particular. In order 
to legitimize the existing external boundaries, 
internal governance and enhance its mass support 
base, the governing elite of ex-Soviet republics 
of Central Asia are indulged in the process of 
nation-forging by using historiography as an a 
significant instrument to obtain the said objective. 
Construction, deconstruction and reconstruction 
of historical accounts in a subjective manner are 
the key features of historiography in making it 
instrumental for achieving the desired ends. 
The present article explains how the state 
administration in Uzbekistan through some 
non-professional historians and state controlled 
media is indulged in using historiography as 
an instrument for its personal and public ends. 
Besides, attempt has also been made to analyse 
implications such historiography in domestic 
circles as well as in the foreign affairs. 
Post-Soviet Uzbekistan:  
Need For New Historiography
After the coup of August 1991 and subsequent 
demise of the Soviet Union, the governing elite 
in newly emerged state of Uzbekistan faced 
certain fundamental problems which demanded 
immediate solution. First, the leadership in the 
post-Soviet Uzbekistan was not changed even 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The old 
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Soviet loyalist leader, Islam Karimov became 
the President of the new Uzbek republic. It was 
essential for Karimov to establish himself as the 
viable and legitimate leader of common masses. 
Second, the Soviet collapse and withdrawal 
of Russians from Central Asia including 
Uzbekistan created an ideological vacuum in 
the newly emerged republic (March, 2003: 312). 
And wherever an ideological vacuum arises, it is 
obviously filled by another ideology. Thus it was 
crucial for the governing elite to introduce a new 
state ideology to replace Communism and fill the 
said vacuum. Third, though, Uzbekistan emerged 
out of ashes of Soviet Union, but even then, being 
a part of Soviet Union, there was no popular 
demand for freedom or separation in the territory 
against the mighty state. Thus, no mass movement 
was emerged or existed for the said cause. Fourth, 
since Uzbekistan emerged as a sovereign political 
entity on the globe theoretically, it was pertinent 
for it to be the same in reality as well. For this, it 
was necessary for Uzbekistan to develop a national 
culture to remove the Russian influence from 
Uzbeks’ lives and come out of the aura of the ex-
Soviet Union which was dominated by the Russian 
traditions, culture and values. Lastly, nationality 
question was one of those factors that had led to 
disintegration of Soviet Union. This question had 
remained unresolved even in new post-Soviet 
republics. Amidst, the inherited multi-ethnic 
demographic structures having trans-border 
affiliations and vice versa irredentist claims, 
Uzbekistan required to cultivate a national loyalty 
that may subordinates the parochial allegiances 
and accomplish the twin tasks of nation-forging 
and state-formation on priority basis (Weisbrode, 
1997: 54 and Kumar, 2005: 334-336). Thus, the 
fundamental problems such as viability and 
legitimacy of leadership among common masses, 
post-Soviet ideological vacuum, replacement of 
communism with state nationalism, dominance 
of Soviet (Russian) traditions and requirement of 
de-russification, the question of nation-forging 
and state-formation amidst the multi-ethnic 
population and cross-border irredentist claims 
compelled the governing elite of Uzbekistan to 
think and develop an effective strategy to resolve 
said problems. Consequently, the leadership felt 
the need of new historiography for republic and 
to make it instrumental in resolving the problems 
faced by them. 
Post-Soviet Historiography:  
Nature and Ingredients 
As the circumstances necessitated, the 
governing elite of Uzbekistan decided to 
strengthen its position among the common 
masses by indulging itself implicitly or explicitly 
in writing and rewriting the new distorted and 
manipulated version of historiography and then 
propagating the same in public. This work has 
been done by the governing elite through non-
professional historians by using its state apparatus. 
New Uzbek historiography is anti-Soviet in 
nature. It also encompasses elements such as the 
glorification of Uzbek’s past, protuberance of 
heroism and greatness of the existing leadership 
and projection of Tamerlane as the ‘Father of 
Nation’. Propagation of such history is being 
done through school text books, through state 
controlled media, public ceremonies, public 
monuments and public museums. 
Negative Characterization  
of the Soviet Union
The new history of Uzbekistan reflects 
strong anti-Soviet feelings as it is intended 
to characterize the Soviet Union negatively. 
Although, Uzbekistan was the part of Soviet 
Union for more than seventy years long period, 
yet the Karimov regime seems to be fascinated 
in the absolute rejection or disassociation with 
that period. No doubt, the Soviets had also 
used historiography as an instrument, but 
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they did so to create a broader Soviet identity, 
legitimize the greater entity, bring ethnic 
harmony and promote patriotism among diverse 
nationalities while stressing on the superiority 
of the Russians as ‘natural leaders’ and the 
‘elder brothers’. They highlighted the absence 
of ‘ethnic hostility between Russians and 
non-Russians’ and emphasized that the non-
Russians were not ‘conquered territories.’ They 
had joined the Tsarist or Soviet empires only 
through ‘unions’ and ‘re-unions’ which had only 
brought positive benefits for these territories. 
As per the Soviets, it was ‘better’ for Central 
Asian territories including Uzbekistan to have 
been ‘reunited’ with Russia than conquered by 
the British Empire. Furthermore, in the Soviet 
view, non-Russians were irrational, backwards 
and incapable of creating their own independent 
states and hence, ‘civilizing mission’ of the 
Russians was ‘beneficial’ for the people and 
territories of Central Asian region (Critchlow, 
1991:119; Ersanali, 2002: 346; Kuzio, 2001: 111 
and; Kuzio, 2002: 245-246). Thus, the Soviets, in 
a way, used historiography to rationalize these 
territories as a part of the Union and also to 
maintain the ethnic harmony and co-existence.
 Now, the post-Soviet governing elite in its 
new historiography is deconstructing the Soviet 
historiography by downgrading the Russia’s 
‘civilizing mission’ and terming the Tsarist and 
Soviet periods as ‘colonialist’ which had harmed 
identities and cultures of indigenous populations. 
A new but negative image of the Russians, as 
‘violent invaders’ who brought ‘sorrow and 
pain’ to the Uzbek people is being constructed. 
Thus, new histiography gives over-stress on the 
negative impacts of Soviet rule on its economy, 
environment and gene pool of population. It 
terms the entire era of Uzbekistan as being a part 
of Soviet Union as a period of fear, degradation 
and dishonour in which Moscow had only goal 
of creating ‘enslavement’ of the Uzbeks on the 
country’s boundless cotton plantations(Samari, 
Ashurov and Ibragimov, 2002: NP).
A range of incidents of ethnic clash that the 
Soviets had played down in order to uphold the 
ethnic harmony between Russians and Uzbeks, 
have been included and glorified in the new 
historiography. For example, a new textbook of 
historiography, written by Jumaboi Rakhimov, 
the occurrence of an Uzbek rebellion against the 
Tsarist conscription during the First World War in 
which 4,000 Russians were killed by the Uzbeks, 
has been re-evaluated. The new interpretation 
not only terms the same Uzbek rebellion as a 
‘heroic action’ of the ‘courageous sons’ of the 
Uzbek people but also defend the killings of the 
Russians(Samari, Ashurov and Ibragimov, 2002: 
NP).
No doubt under the Czarist Empire, Central 
Asia was a colony and Tsarist regime used this 
territory for its strategic and economic benefits 
especially in stopping a British advance from 
India. The Soviet authorities claimed that post-
Tsarist Central Asia was no longer a colony. 
Nevertheless, the experience gave resemblance of 
post-Tsarist Central Asia or Soviet Central Asia 
as ‘colony’ and the Soviet Union an ‘empire’. 
The Soviets built a railroad connection to Russia, 
encouraged the planting of cash crops such as 
cotton and controlled most sensitive industries 
such as gold and military production. It had fixed 
high import tax for foreign goods in Central Asia 
and, thus, turned the region into a ‘captive market’ 
for Russian industrial products (Pipes, 1983: 155-
174). Irrespective of the colonial nature, under 
the Soviet rule these territories were benefitted in 
different ways. The Soviets constructed schools, 
hospitals, roads and railways. They established 
industrial and infrastructural development while 
creating the huge employment and educational 
opportunities for the local population which is a 
positive contribution of the Soviets that benefitted 
the people during and after the demise of the 
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said regime (McAfee, 2011: 7 and 36). Besides, 
Moscow had done national delimitation of the 
region. It was also the Soviets those who created 
and allowed the existence of autonomous regions 
such as Gorno-Badakhshan (Tajikistan)1 and 
Qaraqalpaqstan (Uzbekistan)2 which are unique 
models of autonomous units for specific ethnic 
groups even today in the world. Thus, depiction 
of the Tsarist and Soviet regimes merely as 
‘destructive’ and ‘oppressive’ ‘colonizers’ in the 
new Uzbek historiography reflects the subjective 
and illogical approach of the Karimov regime 
which is undermining the positive contribution 
of the Soviets (Russians) in the modernization 
and development of the society, economy, and 
institutions in the Central Asia region. 
Erosion of Soviet Past
Apart from the negative construction and 
anti-Soviet nature, new Uzbek historiography 
is aimed at the erosion of Soviet past from the 
collective memory through which reflects in 
the various policies and actions of the Karimov 
regime. The Uzbek leadership has not only 
shown its commitment to political stability, 
insistence on privatization instead of political 
liberalization, vigorous defence of sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, but also pronounced shift 
away from country’s dependence on the Russia for 
communication and transportation and reduction 
of Russians’ dominance in the military (Kuzio, 
2002: NP). It is believed in the ruling circles that 
alongwith the construction of negative and anti-
Soviet history, the corrosion and deconstruction of 
the Soviet past from the Uzbek people’s memory 
is the key to prospective prosperity of the state 
and people in Uzbekistan. Guided by such beliefs, 
the governing elite have replaced various symbols 
of the Soviet period from the museums, parks 
and streets. Thus, in 2009 monument installed 
in front of the Armed Forces Museum depicting 
Soviet soldiers erected during the Soviet era, was 
dismantled by authorities in the middle of one 
night and on 12th January, 2010, a new monument 
representing a soldier kneeling and taking an oath 
while kissing the flag of Uzbekistan was installed 
at the same place by the Uzbek soldiers in the 
Military Glory Park. Other symbols of Soviet 
period met with the same fate throughout the new 
country. The Soviet period monuments have been 
toppled or dismantled. Authorities have not just 
toppled or dismantled the monuments only those 
of Lenin, Stalin and other communist leaders, 
but also those were commemorating the Soviet 
fight against fascism during the Second World 
War. Names of streets have also been targeted in 
the politics of new historiography. In the north 
of the Qaraqalpaq Autonomous Republic, the 
city centre of Nukus there once was a sculpture 
of Qaraqalpaq and Russian girls symbolising the 
friendship of the two peoples. The monument 
had a few adjustments made to it: the Russian girl 
was removed and the Qaraqalpaq girl remained. 
Authorities dismantled the entire monument. 
Furthermore, the Uzbek Armed Forces Museum 
has brought now under the Academy of Arts, 
which will display art that symbolises the power 
of the new Uzbekistan. Abdmalik Kudratokhunov, 
Curator of the Academy also opine that an 
extensive campaign to rewrite the history of 
Uzbekistan has occurred in which all the streets 
that were named after scholars who lived in Soviet 
times are receiving ‘neutral’ names. For example, 
the street upon which the new monument now 
stands was named after the academician Habib 
Abdullayev, a famous geologist who contributed 
greatly to the establishment of the country’s 
metallurgical industry. However, this street now 
carries the name of ‘Mirzo Ulugbek’ (Kurbanov, 
2010: NP). Thus, destruction/deconstruction of 
history which belonged to the predecessor state 
is a key feature of new Uzbek historiography. 
Primary objective of such attempt is to bring out 
the people from the Soviet aura so that they may 
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feel the citizens of a new independent sovereign 
country. 
‘Lengthy Freedom Struggle’
A significant feature of the new 
historiography is the construction of a false long 
freedom struggle of Uzbekistan against the Soviet 
Union. Charles Kurzman argues that “Uzbekistan 
...had almost no nationalist movement prior to 
independence ...Uzbekistan was both created and 
granted independence at Moscow’s command, 
not through nationalist mobilization”(Kurzman, 
1999: 78). Inspite of the fact that Uzbekistan 
lacked an ‘organized dissident’ or national 
democratic movement in the Soviet era, the 
independence of the Republic from Soviet Union 
is being depicted a product of a ‘lengthy Uzbek 
struggle’ and not a result of dissolution of the 
Soviet Union (Critchlow, 1999: 120 and Kuzio, 
2002: NP).
Often it is argued that Karimov was one of the 
‘most brutal dictators’ of the former Soviet Union 
and deceleration of independence of the country 
was an opportunistic move on his part(Trevelar, 
2004: NP). A coup had been attempted against 
the Gorbachev government by disaffected hard-
liners in Moscow in August 1991, which was a 
catalyst for independence movements throughout 
the Soviet Union. In the absence of a popular 
movement in Uzbekistan, initially the pro-Soviet 
elite in Uzbekistan were reluctant to support the 
August coup. Anyhow, when events brought 
them to that point, the governing elite adapted 
themselves quickly to the new realities and the 
Supreme Soviet of Uzbekistan declared the 
independence of republic on 31st August, 1991. 
Beyond doubt, this step was approved by the 
people of Uzbekistan through a referendum which 
was held in December, 1991 and was passed with 
98.2 percent of the popular vote (Curtis, 1996: 
NP). Despite all these developments, there was 
no freedom struggle which is being claimed by 
the Karimov regime. But even then, it is being 
argued in the new oral and written historiography 
that in the so-called ‘freedom struggle’, people 
of Uzbekistan faced various difficulties to get 
rid out of the shackles of ‘obsolete totalitarian’ 
Soviet system. They fought against terrible 
political repression of the ‘colonial regime’. And 
during this, their dignity and honor were trampled 
and lives were broken (Karimov, 2011: NP). In 
this context, on the occasion of the twentieth 
anniversary of independence of Uzbekistan which 
was celebrated under the topic “Dearest, Holiest 
Motherland – Independent Uzbekistan”, President 
Karimov, in his “Independence Day Address” on 
31st August 2011, told the people of the country to 
remember the difficulties that they had witnessed 
during the ‘independence struggle’. He said:
...,we all should recall once again how 
difficult it was to free ourselves from the 
shackles of a totalitarian regime, how the 
situation in the country in the last days 
of that regime’s existence, on the eve 
of independence, exacerbated, getting 
dangerous, more and more menacing 
(Karimov, 2011: NP).
Karimov also said that during the anti-
colonial struggle they were determined for 
freedom of the country and that is why they had 
rejected the Soviet regime decisively in 1991. To 
quote Karimov: 
...whatever troubled days we had to endure, 
no matter what difficulties and obstacles 
on the path to independence we had to 
overcome, no matter what threats to our 
country might sound, in moments of 
toughest tests we remained faithful to the 
idea of independence, put the interests of 
Uzbekistan above everything, have not 
turned off from the chosen path and..., will 
never do (Karimov, 2011: NP).
Thus, the construction of the history of 
freedom struggle against the Soviet Union gives 
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an appearance of the Karimov administration’s 
instrumental approach towards historiography 
in creating an ideology of national independence 
which may prove a catalyst in consolidating the 
new state and getting mass support to actions and 
policies of the current regime.
Tamerlane: A National Hero 
The usefulness of Tamerlane’s ‘powerful 
personality’ in state legitimating makes him a 
prominent figure in the new historiography of 
Uzbekistan (Manz, 2002: 15). Karimov regime’s 
search of glorious and usable past and new 
heroes has made, Tamerlane as the ‘central icon’ 
of new historiography. He is being illustrated 
as the ‘spiritual founder’ or ‘Father of Nation’ 
while his era is termed as the “Golden age” of 
the Uzbek nation (Akiner, 1997: 369; Cassandra, 
1994: 30; Hegarty, 1995: 28-29; Radnitz, 2006: 
658; and Suleymanov, 2004: NP). The centralized 
state under Tamerlane’s leadership is being 
depicted as a model for modern Uzbekistan. 
His statecraft is portrayed as inspiration for 
various contemporary policies from taxation and 
agricultural reform to the creation of a unified 
Central Asian market (Hegarty, 1995: 28-29). 
This sort of historiography could be noticed in 
the state exhibitions, erection of Tamerlane’s 
monuments, depiction of his portraits in public 
places, construction of Timurids museum and 
celebrations of his anniversaries. Same thing can 
also be seen in the naming of schools, streets, 
administrative districts, public organizations, 
and state medals and awards(March, 2002: 376).3 
Various academic events are being organized to 
honor and study his life, legacy and historical 
importance. Hyper-Tamerlaneism is also observed 
in the enormous publications and speeches by 
academicians, public officials and the Uzbek 
President (Adams, 2010: 30-32). Nevertheless, 
this hyper-Tamerlaneism in historiography is far 
away from objectivity as it has both omitted brutal 
campaigns and authoritarianism of Tamerlane or 
has been justified by describing a ‘necessity’ of 
time period and size of his empire(Suleymanov, 
2004: NP).
Tamerlane, throughout his life, conquered 
and killed innocent people. He invaded India 
in 1398. During this invasion, he massacred the 
entire population of Delhi, destroyed everything 
in his way and built towers from 100,000 of his 
victims’ skulls. In 1401, he took Damascus and 
slaughtered 20,000 people (McCray, 2004: 48-49). 
While describing Tamerlane as conqueror of the 
thrones of 27 kings who ruled over the kingdoms 
of Turan, Iran, Rum, Magrib, Shom, Misr, 
Iraq, Mizandaran, Gilon, Shirbon, Azerbaijan, 
Fars, Khorson, Jete, Dashti, Khorezm, Khotan, 
Kabulistan, Bakhtarzamin and Hindustan, 
Stephen Kinzer says that he “...cemented whole 
populations into towers to starve, massacred as 
many as 100,000 civilians in a day, bombarded 
ships with human heads shot from cannons and 
left pyramids of skulls to mark the cities he 
destroyed”(Kinzer, 1997: NP). Tamerlane killed 
17 million people (McCray, 2004: 48-49). Thus, he 
was a cruel and destructive ruler who contributed 
nothing. As Thomas R. McCray (2004: 49) also 
observes: 
...he [Tamerlane] was a brutal conqueror 
and a terrible ruler. He built no societies, 
helped no one, and improved nothing. 
Despite all these things, in the post-Soviet 
historiography, the Karimov regime has not only 
tried to rationalize and deconstruct the brutal 
and bloodthirsty image of Tamerlane but also 
has attempted to construct a positive sketch of 
his personality and contribution to Central Asia 
(McCray, 2004: 48-49). For example, Director of 
the Tashkent State Museum, Nozim Khabibullaev, 
said that he had assiduously searched for a 
contemporary account attesting to the truth of 
stories related to Tamerlane’s brutalities including 
that he built pyramids of skulls but found none. 
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On the other hand, Karimov regime tells the 
people of Uzbekistan that most of the stories of 
Tamerlane’s brutality are a product of hyperbole 
and exaggeration by the outsiders who have 
twisted these to blacken the reputation of Central 
Asian region including Uzbekistan (Kinzer, 1997: 
NP). As Karimov (1996: 135) says:
The name of Amir Temur was blacked out 
from the pages of our history in an attempt 
to bury him in oblivion. The goal was to 
remove the national consciousness from 
the soul of the people so that it might lose 
its sense of pride and reconcile itself to its 
dependence and subordination. Our people, 
trapped for so many years in the clutches 
of the colonial vice, are no longer deprived 
of the opportunity to honour our great 
compatriot and render to him his historical 
due. 
Therefore, Karimov regime lauds Tamerlane 
for eliminating chaos and establishing order. It is 
being argued that Tamerlane converted a ‘black 
hole’ in the heart of Eurasia from a Hobbesian 
space of ‘war of all against all’ into a ‘zone of 
peace’ (Megoran, 2004: 351). Islam Karimov, in 
his speeches and writings, depicts him as “…a 
wise leader, the creator of a centralized state, and 
an enlightened ruler and protector of the arts and 
sciences” (Suleymov, 2004: NP). Karimov also 
says that Tamerlane was a man of destiny who was 
sent to liberate and uplift homeland at a difficult 
time (Manz, 2002: 23). While de-constructing 
the Mongol tribal identity of Tamerlane, efforts 
are being made to construct his Uzbek identity 
by terming him ethnically an Uzbek who unified 
the Uzbeks in the 14th Century. In reality, he 
never belonged to Uzbek ethnic community. He 
belonged to a Mongol tribe and came to power 
through personal and tribe alliances while 
showing a mastery and endurance in the same. 
He and his descendants had actually fought with 
the Uzbek tribes, who at that time occupied 
territory in between the Syrdaria, Volga, and 
Irtish rivers. Tamerlane and his descendants 
were exterminating the Uzbek tribes rather than 
uniting them into one nation (Soucek, 2000: 
124). Thus despite all this, Karimov, in his words 
commemorated on the Tashkent museum wall, 
argues that “If somebody wants to understand 
who the Uzbeks are?” and “if somebody wants 
to comprehend all the power, might, justice and 
unlimited abilities of the Uzbek people, their 
contribution to global development, their belief 
in the future, he should recall the image of Amir 
Temur [Tamerlane]” (Suleymanov, 2004: NP). 
Besides such developments, a comparison is 
being drawn between the Tamerlane’s Empire 
and modern Uzbekistan and populist slogans 
of Uzbekistan as a ‘State with a Great Future’ 
and ‘Greater Uzbekistan’ are being made in the 
political circles(March, 2003: 308). 
Uzbekistan did not fight for the 
independence, and hence, it lacked any major 
figure of national resistance from Tsarist Russian 
and Soviet period (Manz, 2002: 21). Regardless 
of the disadvantages of Soviet rule, Uzbekistan 
was as a part of a superpower which was a matter 
of pride for it. But now, it is no longer a part of 
the superpower, and looking for recognition as a 
great power. Alongwith other global and regional 
powers, it has geopolitical ambitions to introduce 
a new political order in Central Asian while 
filling the power vacuum that was created with 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union(Weisbrode, 
1997: 60). Reportedly, the Karimov regime feels 
that territory was a ‘seat of high culture’ and thus, 
central to world history. But it lost its centrality 
to world politics due to the Soviet domination 
(Manz, 2002: 22). After the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union, Uzbek leadership feels that it has 
again an opportunity for a higher role in the world 
affairs and to become regional potentate in its own 
right to be the deal-makers and peacekeepers in 
the world politics as once it was under Tamerlane 
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(Weisbrode, 1997: 58). Furthermore, the Uzbek 
people are subject to regionalism. They divide 
themselves according to the area of their residence 
such as Samarkand-Jizzakh, Tashkent, Bukhara 
and Ferghana valley. Thus, Tamerlane can serve 
the purpose of Uzbekistan. The breadth of his 
conquests and his reputation are major assets 
which boost the prestige of Uzbekistan within 
Central Asia, and give it an independent place in 
the world history (Manz, 2002: 22). Tamerlane 
had achieved worldwide prestige and recognition. 
He built a multinational empire by integrating 
the region into a world actor that was powerful 
enough to influence events throughout Europe, 
Asia, and Middle East (Weisbrode, 1997: 57). 
Therefore, claim of the Uzbekness of Tamerlane 
in new historiography could be handy to fulfil 
the geo-political ambitions of Uzbekistan. It 
provides a historical base to establish Uzbekistan 
a great power and hegemonic of the region while 
undermining the regional divisions (Hegarty, 
1995: 28-29). 
Karimov: “The Brave”
President Islam Karimov is being presented 
a brave leader and champion of the freedom 
of Uzbekistan. Visual and oral historical 
programmes broadcasted by the Uzbek Media 
and textbooks that are taught in the schools focus 
on the heroism and great leadership of Karimov 
and, as it appears, are determined to elevate 
President as a ‘superman-type’ figure(McCray, 
2004: 48). These text books and programmes not 
only exaggerate the role of Karimov in securing 
Uzbekistan’s freedom but also in the various 
situations of crisis in the Soviet and post-Soviet 
period. Karimov has been trained and skilled in 
totalitarian methods. He is formulating domestic 
and foreign policy single-handedly. Thus, as 
McCray (2004: 48) writes:
President Karimov is the unchallenged star 
of television news. Every day, he is shown 
in meetings, greeting dignitaries, delivering 
speeches, writing his programs, signing 
agreements and travelling around the 
country....Even his past activities are shown 
and re-shown, sometimes with stirring 
background music and often without 
reference to when the activities took place. 
It is sometimes difficult to believe than one 
man stay so busy. 
The Uzbek television on the occasion of 
country’s 20th Independence Day in August, 2011 
telecasted a series devoted to Karimov and the 
leadership he showed before, during and after 
demise of Soviet Union. One programme of the 
series entitled “On the Eve of Independence, 
or The Last Agony of the Soviets” was mostly 
based on Karimov’s book, “On the Threshold of 
Independence.” This programme was started with 
women picking cotton in the snow which portrayed 
Uzbek people’s ‘meaningless’ ‘depressed’ and 
hopeless life under Soviet rule. After this, said 
programme highlighted the heroism of Karimov. 
He was presented as a ‘man of action.’ Ethnic 
animosities were occurred in the Fergana Valley 
in 1989 in which local Meskhetian Turks were 
assaulted by Uzbeks and Uzbek and Kyrgyz 
were clashed in the Kyrgyz city of Osh. Moscow 
showed determination to purge the violence and 
thus, appointed Islam Karimov as first Secretary 
of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan. The 
appointment of Karimov, non-local party elite, 
signified that Moscow was interested in the 
reduction of tensions by appointing an outsider 
who had not been involved in the purges. 
However, the telecasted programme boasted that 
when there was violence against the Meskhetian 
Turks in the Central Boka District of Tashkent 
Region, Karimov went on horseback and tried 
to stop the violence. Another thing which was 
highlighted in the programme was that when Osh 
riots took place between Uzbeks and Kyrgyzs and 
rioters attacking Uzbeks arms and helicopters, 
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Islam Karimov arrived at the scene immediately. 
He calmed the feuding Uzbeks and Kyrgyz. 
Programme concluded that a great victory 
was scored due to the conscientious efforts of 
Karimov. This incident is missing in the annals 
of history. Prior to this, it was established that 
famous Kyrgyz writer Chingiz Aitmatov was the 
person who calmed the rioters in Osh. Karimov 
also showed up after thousands of Soviet troops 
poured into the Osh area(Yusupov and Pannier, 
2011: NP). 
Programme also distorted the incident of 
December 1991 where in Namangan, Karimov 
was forced to sit down in hall and listen to Tohir 
Yuldash, the future leader of the Al-Qaeda-linked 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and lecture him 
on government and Islam. The Uzbek television 
in the said programme offered a very different 
but distorted interpretation of the incident. It said 
that Karimov went to meet a group of people in 
eastern Namangan region who had seized local 
government offices to demand Uzbekistan be 
declared an Islamic state. Karimov arrived at 
the scene of the riot. It was a tragic scene. There 
were a lot if youths who minds were poisoned 
with religious extremism. Karimov then took 
a microphone from Tohir Yuldash, the leader 
of the crowd. As in Osh, according to Uzbek 
television programme, Karimov’s words were 
adequate to resolve the volatile situation. There 
is no mention of Birlik activist Nosir Zokir, who 
actually took the microphone from Karimov and 
demanded that freedom of assembly be resorted 
in the country. Karimov, again according to 
Uzbek television, championed his nation’s 
independence from the very beginning and 
seized the opportunity when the ‘putchisti’ were 
downed in Moscow. He is portrayed as a leader 
who cut short his visit to India in order to take 
matters into his own hands once he heard about 
the coup. The programme did not mention that 
in March 1991 Karimov led the campaign to 
maintain the Soviet Union. In those days he told 
the people of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic 
that “our rivers will run with milk if we stay 
within the Soviet Union, but if we leave it, our 
rivers will fill with blood”. Thus, Islam Karimov 
in the new historiography is being projected as 
a great leader equalling to the Tamerlane who is 
believed to be a great leader, who created a great 
empire, who glorifies the region, and who had 
his capital in Samarkand. All this is being done 
by the state through its propaganda machine 
to construct parallels between the two rulers. 
Karimov is also from Samarkand. He glorifies 
Uzbekistan in his writings and speeches. He 
is also trying to unite the people. Whatever 
his policies are, similar to those of Tamerlane. 
His policies are demand of the time(Yusupov 
and Pannier, 2011: NP). Thus comparison 
between the Tamerlane and Karimov in new 
historiography establishes that the main agenda 
of the governing elite incorporates the creation 
of a strong ‘Uzbek state’ as was the Tamerlane’s 
Empire and the establishing Karimov as a great 
leader as it was the Tamerlane. It has been 
observed that Karimov regime has not met the 
material needs of country’s population. Loss of 
subsidies from Moscow, deeply rooted corruption 
and the expenditure of maintaining own cronies 
in power by the Karimov administration have 
slowed down economic growth and kept much 
of the population in poverty. Pensions and real 
wages have been massively devalued, universal 
healthcare system has crumbled and full 
employment has evaporated. Mass arrests and 
imprisonment of political suspects, their trials, 
executions, torture and extra-judicial killings are 
the evidence of prevailing deceptive democracy 
and authoritarianism in the country(Treveler, 
2004: NP). Thus, in the prevailing political 
atmosphere, new historiography is key instrument 
to defend and consolidate his position among the 
common masses. 
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Bangs of New Historiography 
The new Soviet historiography which 
brings anti-Russian scenery while eroding the 
Soviet symbols and omitting the Soviet past and 
its contribution to the modern Uzbek state has 
received a strong reaction from the people of 
Uzbekistan in domestic sphere and from Russian 
Government in external spheres. 
Reportedly, teacher community is not 
satisfied with the new textbooks of history 
prescribed by the authorities for schools. Though 
they are being forced by the government to teach 
and work with the new textbooks, according to 
them, new historiography would be destructive 
for the ethnic harmony. Since a significant 
number of Russians are residing in Uzbekistan, 
the anti-Russian historiography would, as they 
suspect, fuel animosity among the Uzbeks 
against the Russians. Keeping such threats in 
their mind, some of the teachers in urban areas 
are trying to interpret and teach the historical 
events objectively. An Uzbek history teacher 
Samira Tashmukhamedova, in a meeting of 
history teachers explained that in each lecture 
she offers objective interpretation of events and 
after each lesson she reminds her students not 
to think negatively against the Russian people. 
Opposite to this, teachers of rural areas do not 
offer objective explanations of events related to 
Russians which that have been incorporated in the 
books of new historiography. They simply teach 
the students whatever has been written in the 
books. In other words, they blame the Russians 
for all the troubles of the Uzbek people as they 
killed their ancestors, robbed natural resources 
and turned them into slaves (Samar, Ashurov and 
Ibragimov, 2002: NP). 
The attempts to erode the Soviet past through 
the wreckage of monuments of Soviet period have 
also not been appreciated in the different quarters. 
Infact, the move against the monument of Second 
World War in Tashkent has been disapproved by 
the people. As Abdurakhman Tashanov, a human 
rights activist said:
Here stood a monument of a soldier with 
a gun in his hands … striving forward. … 
And, what did we get in return? A soldier 
with a bowed head.… You see all this, 
and your heart immediately goes cold 
(Kurbanov, 2010: NP).
This move of the Uzbek government also 
frustrated even the war veterans. Jalol Sultanov, 
a war veteran, criticized the government for 
the destruction of monument related to Second 
World War by saying that the Great Patriotic 
War (World War II) affected the fates of millions 
of people, and the Uzbek people were not an 
exception. Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
also expressed following discontent against the 
said move of the Uzbekistan:
Today, the demolition of the Soldier-
Liberator Monument is an axe blow to 
history, to the memory of the veterans 
who fought for the liberation of the great 
Motherland. We are now presented as 
mercenaries who fought for another country 
(Kurbanov, 2010: NP).
The Uzbek Foreign Ministry had responded 
that the demolished monument had no ‘intellectual 
weight’ and was merely an ideological reflection 
of the old regime. Thus, as per the representative 
of Uzbek Ministry of Defence, on the eve of the 
18th anniversary of the independent country’s 
national army, the said monument was important 
to raise the morale of soldiers and officers of 
national army(Kurbanov, 2010: NP).
The governing elite are satisfied with these 
developments. They justify the inclusion of 
anti-Russian feelings and erosion of Soviet past 
from the new historiography. In their opinion, 
as Uzbek President Islam Karimov has told 
parliament in August, 2002, the ‘shadow’ of 
the Soviet Union was a major raison d’être for 
problems of Uzbek society. With the introduction 
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of new historiography now new generations are 
growing up free of the ‘totalitarian heritage’ of 
the Soviet Union. New generation now, does not 
even know the names of the Soviet leaders which 
in the eyes of Uzbek government is a positive 
development. Uzbek President explained the 
Parliament that:
Having visited one of the schools, I 
asked adolescents, if they knew who was 
Brezhnev? They answered, ‘No, we don’t’. 
Then I asked them, ‘Who is Gorbachev?’ 
They again said that they didn’t know. And 
I told them that they are doing great (Samar, 
Ashurov and Ibragimov, 2002: NP).
These developments may ensemble the 
Karimov regime but not the country. Such things 
would generate a vicious atmosphere among 
the rural areas leading to the destruction of 
ethnic fraternity. Besides, this would undermine 
the Uzbekistan and Russian relations. Such 
apprehensions have even been raised by the 
independent journalists from Samarkand like 
of Artur Samari, Kamiljon Ashurov and Uktam 
Ibragimov (Samar, Ashurov and Ibragimov, 
2002: NP).
Though, from the state perspective, 
nothing seems wrong in promoting Tamerlane 
as a symbol of Uzbek national pride, as a ‘just 
ruler’ and ‘fountainhead’ of Uzbekistan or as 
an emblem of Uzbekistan’s re-emergence as an 
independent regional power(Melvin, 2000: 46). 
But from a broader non-state perspective, use 
of Tamerlane-centric historiography, to rectify 
Karimov regime’s decisions, policies, values and 
choices to make them historically inevitable, is 
destructive for the evolving democratic culture 
in the political arena as it is instrumental in 
promoting and legitimizing the Karimov’s 
authoritarianism(March, 2002: 382). President 
Karimov has even himself confessed and validated 
the authoritarian tendencies that prevails in his 
administration. He says:
I admit: perhaps in my actions there 
are signs of authoritarianism. But this I 
explain as follows: in certain periods of 
history, especially during the construction 
of statehood, strong executive power is 
necessary. It is necessary in order to avoid 
bloodshed and conflict, to preserve in the 
region inter-ethnic and civil harmony, 
peace, and stability, for which I am prepared 
to pay any price(Karimov, 1996: 135).
Whatever reasons may have been given by 
the Karimov regime to justify his authoritarian 
administration but this can not validate the 
deteriorating situation of the human rights in the 
country. Amidst the Karimov administration’s 
attempts to use the history for explaining and 
justifying the present policies and actions, as 
Russell Zanca (2000: NP) opines, Uzbekistan has 
already become:
 ... a bit undemocratic, corrupt, nepotistic, 
and oligarchic. It has become superlatively 
dictatorial and cruel -- it is a vicious state. 
Its treatment of its citizens is neo-Stalinist 
to the core.
Hence, endorsement of personality cult 
and heroism through new historiography is 
harmful for civil, democratic and stable future of 
Uzbekistan.
Apart from this, Karimov administration 
has already pursued an ‘assertive’, ‘provocative’ 
and ‘unilateralist’ foreign policy. Uzbekistan 
boasts the largest military in the region. It 
allowed the US forces on its territory, intervened 
in the Tajik and Afghan civil wars and also 
engaged in confrontational border policies 
with its neighbouring states(Horseman, 2003: 
51 and Cornell, 2000: 115). Tashkent has 
tried to strengthen its influence among its 
weaker neighbours – Afghanistan, Tajikistan 
and Kyrgyzstan by resorting to both tactics – 
economic pressure as well as force because of 
Kyrgyzstan’s dependence on Uzbek gas and 
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electricity supplies to the Northern Afghanistan. 
Karimov government, as the Tajik President 
Imomali Rakhmonov had accused, had supported 
the Colonel Khudoiberdiev’s unsuccessful 
rebellion in the Northern Tajikistan and even 
some of the guerrillas of Khudoiberdiev had been 
hided in Uzbekistan (Rotar, 1999: NP). Amidst 
such developments, Uzbekistan’s neighbouring 
countries tend to take such historiography 
austerely. Slogans of the revival of Tamerlane’s 
empire may provoke the trans-border ethnic 
Uzbeks for secession from their parent state 
to kin-state Uzbekistan (Weisbrode, 1997: 58). 
Russian Embassy in Tajikistan, in 1999 had 
viewed that “Uzbekistan was undoubtedly trying 
to establish itself as the region’s superpower, 
and the new Uzbek historiography was designed 
to provide an academic basis for Tashkent’s 
geopolitical claims”(Rotar, 1999: NP). Thus, new 
historiography of governing elite has created a 
suspicion of “imperialist designs” of Uzbekistan 
at global and regional level.
Conclusion
To conclude, historiography has emerged 
a prime instrument for the state administration 
in Uzbekistan to achieve the various ends. With 
the assistance of this sort of historiography, 
the said administration is not only attempting 
to legitimize its current politics among the 
common masses but also looking for achieving 
its geopolitical objectives at the regional and 
global level. The new historiography contains 
three contradictory elements – construction, 
deconstruction and reconstruction. First, this 
historiography has constructed false history 
of long national freedom struggle against the 
Soviets, a struggle which never occurred in reality. 
This has also constructed a myth of Karimov’s 
heroism and great leadership during the mythic 
freedom struggle. Second, Soviets’ concept of 
‘big brother’ and their ‘civilizing mission’ vis-à-
vis non-Russians have been deconstructed. Their 
image has been reconstructed as ‘aggressors’, 
‘colonialists’, and ‘suppressors’. Their ‘civilizing 
mission’ has been reconstructed as mission of 
enslavement of Uzbek people. Tamerlane’s image 
has been reconstructed from a brutal invader to 
a wise ruler. The governing elite is well aware 
of the fact, as George Orwell has viewed: Who 
controls the past, controls the future; who controls 
the present, controls the past. That is why with 
the help of construction, deconstruction and 
reconstruction of past, Karimov administration 
not only wants to strengthen its control over the 
future politics of Uzbekistan but also of the Central 
Asian region. And having its control over the 
country’s administration in present, it is capable 
of doing so because of the immense control and 
support of the official machinery. Thus politics 
of new historiography may serve the purpose of 
Karimov government to strengthen its position 
and gaining the mass support but it is harmful 
for the development of democratic culture in the 
country. Moreover, it is generating anti-Russian 
feeling among the indigenous populations 
which threatens the Russian minority residing 
in the country. This also reflects the geopolitical 
ambitions of the country which are a threat to 
regional peace and security. In the larger regional 
and global context, Uzbekistan needs an objective 
historiography. 
Notes
1. Gorno-Badakhshan is an autonomous 
province in the East Tajikistan which was 
created in January 1925 by the Soviets and was 
attached to the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic 
in 1929. It is located in the Pamir Mountains. 
During the Civil war in Tajikistan in 1992, 
initially, the local government of Gorno-
Badakhshan had declared its independence 
from the Republic of Tajikistan but later on it 
backed down from their call for independence 
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and thus, it is remain an autonomous province 
within Tajikistan. 
2. Qaraqalpaqstan (Karakalpakstan) is 
an autonomous province of Uzbekistan which 
is in western part of the country. Qaraqalpaq 
Autonomous Oblast was created on 19th February, 
1925 by separating territories of the ethnic 
Qaraqalpaqs from the Turkestan Autonomous 
Soviet Socialist Republic and Khorezm People’s 
Soviet Republic. Initially, it was located within 
the Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. 
Then, it was transferred to the Russian Soviet 
Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) from 
20th July, 1930 to 20th March, 1932, at which time 
it was elevated to the Qaraqalpaq Autonomous 
Soviet Socialist Republic (Qaraqalpaq ASSR). 
The Qaraqalpaq ASSR was attached to the Uzbek 
Soviet Socialist Republic from 5th December, 
1936. Since then it is remain a part of Uzbekistan 
while enjoying an autonomous status. 
3. An exhibition titled “Unique Treasures 
of the Timurids Epoch in World Collections” was 
opened at the State Museum of Timurids History 
in Tashkent on 25th August, 2011. The exhibition 
which was devoted to the 20th anniversary of the 
Uzbekistan’s independence demonstrated ancient 
items, works of crafts and paintings from Museums 
of Russia, Turkey, USA, France and Britain.
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В данной статье рассматривается использование историографии государственной властью 
Узбекистана в качестве инструмента для достижения различных целей, а именно узаконивания 
ее политического авторитета среди народных масс путем провозглашения страны в качестве 
великой силы и удовлетворения ее геополитических амбиций. Автор утверждает, что новая 
историография является антисоветской по своей сути и направлена на уничтожение 
советского прошлого, создавая миф о длительной борьбе за свободу, преподнося Тамерлана 
как национального героя, а узбекского президента Ислама Каримова в качестве смелого лидера 
по его примеру. Субъективная конструкция, деконструкция и реконструкция исторических 
событий являются основными чертами новой историографии постсоветского Узбекистана. 
Несмотря на то что такой подход может послужить источником узаконивания режима 
Каримова и сформировать понимание Узбекистана в качестве великой силы, это также может 
привести к неблагоприятным последствиям как во внутренних кругах, так и в международных 
отношениях, так как будет восприниматься как форма легализации авторитарного режима 
Каримова, возникновение антироссийских настроений и империалистических геополитических 
проектов Узбекистана в Средней Азии. 
Ключевые слова: Каримов, искажение, конструкция, деконструкиция, реконструкция 
историографии, Советы, русские, узбеки, Тамерлан.
